seductive_tee
09-26-2001, 12:20 PM
Weapons slip by Hartsfield checks
By ALAN JUDD
Atlanta Journal-Constitution Staff Writer
A handgun that eluded security workers at Atlanta's Hartsfield
International Airport this week was the latest in a string of weapons
that got past the checkpoint that protects the world's busiest
airport.
Hundreds of guns, a knife and even two bombs failed to attract
attention at Hartsfield's security checkpoints during the past four
years.
Security at Hartsfield was breached 759 times from 1997 to early
2000, according to Federal Aviation Administration records. That
number includes only the breaches that were detected elsewhere inside
the airport; officials say there is no way to know how many dangerous
items actually got aboard planes.
The FAA records analyzed by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution show
that workers at the security checkpoint failed to detect 249
handguns, five rifles or other long-barreled guns, 192 other loaded
weapons and 76 additional unloaded weapons. The reports, which
describe only cases that have been closed at least 12 months, contain
few details on the breaches. But they indicate that the vast majority
occurred at the checkpoint that is supposed to keep such items away
from the airport's gates -- and the planes that park there.
The reports underscore what air safety experts describe as porous
security at all U.S. airports. Public concern about airport security
has heightened since terrorists hijacked planes from three airports
on Sept. 11 and used them to launch attacks on New York and
Washington. No evidence has emerged that lax security allowed the
terrorists to board the four planes that crashed that day.
Still, at Hartsfield, the question came into focus Sunday. A
Tennessee man walked through a metal detector at the security
checkpoint and got onto the international concourse even though he
was carrying a loaded .22-caliber pistol in his pocket. Charles
Hildreth, 63, of Collegedale, Tenn., notified a Delta Air Lines
employee. Police charged Hildreth with having a firearm in a
prohibited area, a misdemeanor. Airport officials said Tuesday a
faulty metal detector allowed Hildreth to enter the secure area with
his gun, even though the machine had been checked earlier in the day.
The detector has been replaced.
"The airport is safe," said Ben DeCosta, Hartsfield's general
manager. No other weapons have been confiscated since the airport
reopened Sept. 13, two days after the terrorist attacks, DeCosta
said. "This was an anomaly."
Hartsfield hardly has the worst security record. Despite the fact
that Hartsfield has the highest passenger volume in the world, seven
other large U.S. airports had more security breaches, including Los
Angeles and Phoenix.
But the number of violations at Hartsfield exceeded those at the
airports where the hijacked Sept. 11 flights originated: Boston
Logan, Newark International and Washington Dulles.
Regardless of the statistics, no U.S. airport provides adequate
security, according to air safety experts.
"It's terrible," said Rick Charles, an aviation safety consultant and
former airline executive who teaches at Georgia State
University. "Hartsfield isn't alone in this. This is our entire
system. We've had a woefully inadequate system for a long time."
David S. Stempler, president of the Air Travelers Association, which
studies safety issues, added: "We have a system in place that's
primarily designed to deal with a 1960s-type threat: a nonviolent,
nonsuicidal hijacker who has a metal object such as a gun or a knife.
The system has been so replete with problems and errors it's amazing
we've done as well as we've done."
DeCosta defended his airport's security record. No U.S. airport has
better technology to detect weapons, he said. And the screeners who
run the checkpoint do a good job, he said, despite their low pay and
high turnover. The starting pay for screeners is $7 an hour -- 25
cents an hour less than the average airport food-court worker earns.
The turnover rate among screeners at Hartsfield -- who work for a
private security company hired by the airlines -- has been as high as
375 percent a year, according to government reports.
The screeners check an average of 104,000 departing passengers every
day -- slightly more than the population of Athens.
"I am absolutely confident" that the airport is secure, DeCosta
said. "It's fully compliant with all federal regulations and is
operating very well."
While recording the 759 security breaches from 1997 to 2000,
Hartsfield was fined only $1,500 by the FAA. Delta, the largest
carrier at Hartsfield, was fined $423,350 for security violations in
Atlanta during that time, part of the more than $3 million it was
fined nationwide.
The 759 security breaches took place in 402 separate incidents,
according to FAA records. The records attributed 293 of those
incidents, or almost 73 percent, to the security checkpoint for
domestic flights. Thirty-eight took place on the concourses, nine at
ticket counters, eight at the security checkpoint for international
flights and seven in baggage claim areas. The records don't reflect
where the other 47 breaches occurred.
The breaches are detected in a number of ways. In some cases, like
the gun incident Sunday, passengers with unauthorized items simply
turn themselves in. Other times, law enforcement officers spot a
weapon and confiscate it. Surveillance cameras sometimes locate
dangerous items. And some, undoubtedly, go undetected.
Knives with blades as long as 4 inches were allowed on planes before
the Sept. 11 attacks. But because the hijackers are believed to have
used box cutters to commandeer the planes, all blades are now banned.
Hartsfield's breaches have occurred even during routine tests of
airport security.
Fifty-two times from 1997 to 2000, records show, Hartsfield's
security screeners did not detect prohibited items carried by
undercover FAA employees.
Among the items: a pipe bomb, two dynamite bombs and two hand
grenades.
DeCosta declined to comment on the security failures during the FAA
tests. So did the FAA.
Hartsfield has a poor history in the FAA tests. In 1994, its
screeners detected 86 percent of prohibited items carried by FAA
employees -- the worst rate at 19 U.S. airports. In 1995,
Hartsfield's screeners caught just 81 percent of the items.
That same year, when FAA employees smuggled bomb-like devices through
Hartsfield, screeners detected them just 28 percent of the time.
How they performed in more recent years is unknown. In 1997, the FAA
designated such data as "sensitive security information."
However, the FAA told the General Accounting Office, the
investigative arm of Congress, in 2000 that nationwide, "screeners'
detection of dangerous objects during its testing is unsatisfactory
and needs improvement."
To Stempler, of the Air Travelers Association, the FAA's handling of
the test data illustrates its failure to protect the nation's air
travel system from terrorist threats.
"Instead of improving the system quickly," Stempler said, "they want
to remove the public discussion out of fear that it would exacerbate
the problem."
Staff writers David A. Milliron and Gary Hendricks contributed to
this article.
By ALAN JUDD
Atlanta Journal-Constitution Staff Writer
A handgun that eluded security workers at Atlanta's Hartsfield
International Airport this week was the latest in a string of weapons
that got past the checkpoint that protects the world's busiest
airport.
Hundreds of guns, a knife and even two bombs failed to attract
attention at Hartsfield's security checkpoints during the past four
years.
Security at Hartsfield was breached 759 times from 1997 to early
2000, according to Federal Aviation Administration records. That
number includes only the breaches that were detected elsewhere inside
the airport; officials say there is no way to know how many dangerous
items actually got aboard planes.
The FAA records analyzed by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution show
that workers at the security checkpoint failed to detect 249
handguns, five rifles or other long-barreled guns, 192 other loaded
weapons and 76 additional unloaded weapons. The reports, which
describe only cases that have been closed at least 12 months, contain
few details on the breaches. But they indicate that the vast majority
occurred at the checkpoint that is supposed to keep such items away
from the airport's gates -- and the planes that park there.
The reports underscore what air safety experts describe as porous
security at all U.S. airports. Public concern about airport security
has heightened since terrorists hijacked planes from three airports
on Sept. 11 and used them to launch attacks on New York and
Washington. No evidence has emerged that lax security allowed the
terrorists to board the four planes that crashed that day.
Still, at Hartsfield, the question came into focus Sunday. A
Tennessee man walked through a metal detector at the security
checkpoint and got onto the international concourse even though he
was carrying a loaded .22-caliber pistol in his pocket. Charles
Hildreth, 63, of Collegedale, Tenn., notified a Delta Air Lines
employee. Police charged Hildreth with having a firearm in a
prohibited area, a misdemeanor. Airport officials said Tuesday a
faulty metal detector allowed Hildreth to enter the secure area with
his gun, even though the machine had been checked earlier in the day.
The detector has been replaced.
"The airport is safe," said Ben DeCosta, Hartsfield's general
manager. No other weapons have been confiscated since the airport
reopened Sept. 13, two days after the terrorist attacks, DeCosta
said. "This was an anomaly."
Hartsfield hardly has the worst security record. Despite the fact
that Hartsfield has the highest passenger volume in the world, seven
other large U.S. airports had more security breaches, including Los
Angeles and Phoenix.
But the number of violations at Hartsfield exceeded those at the
airports where the hijacked Sept. 11 flights originated: Boston
Logan, Newark International and Washington Dulles.
Regardless of the statistics, no U.S. airport provides adequate
security, according to air safety experts.
"It's terrible," said Rick Charles, an aviation safety consultant and
former airline executive who teaches at Georgia State
University. "Hartsfield isn't alone in this. This is our entire
system. We've had a woefully inadequate system for a long time."
David S. Stempler, president of the Air Travelers Association, which
studies safety issues, added: "We have a system in place that's
primarily designed to deal with a 1960s-type threat: a nonviolent,
nonsuicidal hijacker who has a metal object such as a gun or a knife.
The system has been so replete with problems and errors it's amazing
we've done as well as we've done."
DeCosta defended his airport's security record. No U.S. airport has
better technology to detect weapons, he said. And the screeners who
run the checkpoint do a good job, he said, despite their low pay and
high turnover. The starting pay for screeners is $7 an hour -- 25
cents an hour less than the average airport food-court worker earns.
The turnover rate among screeners at Hartsfield -- who work for a
private security company hired by the airlines -- has been as high as
375 percent a year, according to government reports.
The screeners check an average of 104,000 departing passengers every
day -- slightly more than the population of Athens.
"I am absolutely confident" that the airport is secure, DeCosta
said. "It's fully compliant with all federal regulations and is
operating very well."
While recording the 759 security breaches from 1997 to 2000,
Hartsfield was fined only $1,500 by the FAA. Delta, the largest
carrier at Hartsfield, was fined $423,350 for security violations in
Atlanta during that time, part of the more than $3 million it was
fined nationwide.
The 759 security breaches took place in 402 separate incidents,
according to FAA records. The records attributed 293 of those
incidents, or almost 73 percent, to the security checkpoint for
domestic flights. Thirty-eight took place on the concourses, nine at
ticket counters, eight at the security checkpoint for international
flights and seven in baggage claim areas. The records don't reflect
where the other 47 breaches occurred.
The breaches are detected in a number of ways. In some cases, like
the gun incident Sunday, passengers with unauthorized items simply
turn themselves in. Other times, law enforcement officers spot a
weapon and confiscate it. Surveillance cameras sometimes locate
dangerous items. And some, undoubtedly, go undetected.
Knives with blades as long as 4 inches were allowed on planes before
the Sept. 11 attacks. But because the hijackers are believed to have
used box cutters to commandeer the planes, all blades are now banned.
Hartsfield's breaches have occurred even during routine tests of
airport security.
Fifty-two times from 1997 to 2000, records show, Hartsfield's
security screeners did not detect prohibited items carried by
undercover FAA employees.
Among the items: a pipe bomb, two dynamite bombs and two hand
grenades.
DeCosta declined to comment on the security failures during the FAA
tests. So did the FAA.
Hartsfield has a poor history in the FAA tests. In 1994, its
screeners detected 86 percent of prohibited items carried by FAA
employees -- the worst rate at 19 U.S. airports. In 1995,
Hartsfield's screeners caught just 81 percent of the items.
That same year, when FAA employees smuggled bomb-like devices through
Hartsfield, screeners detected them just 28 percent of the time.
How they performed in more recent years is unknown. In 1997, the FAA
designated such data as "sensitive security information."
However, the FAA told the General Accounting Office, the
investigative arm of Congress, in 2000 that nationwide, "screeners'
detection of dangerous objects during its testing is unsatisfactory
and needs improvement."
To Stempler, of the Air Travelers Association, the FAA's handling of
the test data illustrates its failure to protect the nation's air
travel system from terrorist threats.
"Instead of improving the system quickly," Stempler said, "they want
to remove the public discussion out of fear that it would exacerbate
the problem."
Staff writers David A. Milliron and Gary Hendricks contributed to
this article.